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In this paper we study the social preferences obtained from mono-
tone neutral social welfare functions for random individual preferences.
We identify a class of social welfare functions that demonstrate a com-
pletely chaotic behavior: they lead to a uniform probability distribu-
tion on all possible social preference relations and, for every ￿ > 0, if
a small fraction ￿ of individuals change their preferences (randomly)
the correlation between the resulting social preferences and the orig-
inal ones tends to zero as the number of individuals in the society
increases. This class includes natural multi-level majority rules.
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11 Introduction
How likely is it that small random mistakes in counting the votes in an
election between two candidates will reverse the election’s outcome? And if
there are three alternatives and the society prefers alternative a to alternative
b and alternative b to alternative c how likely is it that a will be preferred to
c? We will show that for general social welfare functions these two questions
are closely related.
In this paper we consider the behavior of general social welfare functions
with respect to random uniform voter proﬁles. Namely, the individual pref-
erences on a set of alternatives are uniformly and independently distributed
among all order relations. It turns out that there are two extreme types of
behavior: social welfare functions, such as the majority rule, that lead to the
stochastic stability of the outcome in terms of the perturbation of individ-
ual preferences and social welfare functions that lead to what we refer to as
“social chaos.” 1
These two types of behavior in the case of two alternatives have been
studied in the mathematical literature by Benjamini, Kalai and Schramm
(1999).
A simple game (or voting game) G deﬁned on a set N of players (voters)
is described by a function v that assigns to every subset (coalition) S of
players the value “1” or “0”. We assume that v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1. A
candidate is elected if the set S of voters that voted for him is a winning
coalition in G, i.e., if v(S) = 1. We will always assume that the game G
is monotone, i.e., that if v(R) = 1 and R ⊂ S then v(S) = 1. Recall that
a simple game is proper if v(S) + v(N\S) ≤ 1 for every coalition S, i.e., if
the complement of a winning coalition is a losing one. A simple game G is
1 There are many studies of chaos and chaotic dynamics in economics but they appear
to be rather diﬀerent from this one. In the context of social choice theory, the huge number
of “voting paradoxes” and the fact that “everything can happen” are often referred to as
chaotic phenomena and were studied extensively by Saari; see, e.g., Saari (2001). Saari’s
works are concerned mainly with speciﬁc voting methods like majority, plurality, Borda’s
method, and some weighted versions of them. We refer to the property that “anything can
happen,” as “indeterminacy”. Indeterminacy is diﬀerent from yet related to our notion of
social chaos; see Section 7 and Kalai (2004).
2strong if v(S)+v(N\S) = 1 for every coalition S, i.e., if it is proper and the
complement of a losing coalition is a winning one.
It is convenient to let N = {1,2,...,n} and regard v as a Boolean function
v(x1,x2,...,xn) where each variable xi is a Boolean variable: xi ∈ {0,1}, and
thus v(x1,x2,...,vn) stands for v(S), where S = {i ∈ N : xi = 1}. This
notation is used in much of the relevant mathematics and computer science
literature. It is also consistent with the basic economic interpretation of the
variables xi as signals the voters receive regarding the superior alternative.
A neutral social welfare function F(A) on a set A of m alternatives based
on a proper strong simple game G is deﬁned as follows: the function F(A)
is a map that assigns an asymmetric relation R on the alternatives to every
proﬁle of individual preferences. Given a monotone proper simple game G
and a set A of alternatives, the society prefers alternative a to alternative b
if the set of voters that prefers a to b forms a winning coalition.2
We study probabilistic properties of social welfare functions for random
uniform voter proﬁles. Thus, to every individual, we assign the same proba-
bility (1/m!) for each one of the m! order preference relations on the alter-
natives. Furthermore, the individual preference relations are independent.
In other words, if there are n individuals, we assign the same probability
for each one of the (m!)n possible proﬁles of individual preferences. This
is a standard probabilistic model which has been extensively studied in the
literature especially in the case of the majority rule (see Gehrlein (1997)). It
is worth noting at this point that we will be studying the asymptotic proper-
ties of strong simple games and the associated social welfare functions, and
it will be convenient to describe our results in terms of sequences (Gk)k=1,2,...
of simple games.3
We can describe our notion of social chaos using several equivalent def-
2 The neutral social choice we consider satisﬁes the basic Pareto and IIA conditions.
Of course, we do not assume that the social preference is necessarily an order relation.
3 For our results we will not require any relation between the games Gk for diﬀerent
values of k. It is useful to think of the results applied to the case where the various Gk’s
represent the “same” type of voting rule, such as “simple majority” for diﬀerent population
sizes. But giving a formal deﬁnition of a “voting rule” that applies to populations of
diﬀerent sizes is not an easy matter and, in any case, is not needed in this paper.
3initions and we will start with the following simple deﬁnition based on the
probability of cyclic social preferences when there are three alternatives. Let
G be a monotone strong simple game with n players and let F be a neutral
social welfare function on three alternatives based on G. Consider a random
uniform proﬁle for the individual order preferences between the three alter-
natives. Let pcyc(G) be the probability that the social preferences are cyclic.
Arrow’s theorem asserts that unless G is a dictatorship, pcyc(G) > 0.
Deﬁnition 1.1. The sequence (Gk) of monotone strong simple games leads
to social chaos if
lim
n→∞
pcyc(Gk) = 1/4. (1.1)
There are altogether eight possible social asymmetric relations for three
alternatives, six of which are order relations and two of which are cyclic.
Consider a social welfare function based on a strong monotone simple game
G on three alternatives and the uniform distribution on individual order pref-
erences. Symmetry considerations imply that the probabilities of obtaining
each of the six order relations as the social preference relation are equal, as
are the two probabilities for the two cyclic relations. Therefore, another way
of stating relation (1.1) is that for a social welfare function based on (Gk) on
three alternatives under the uniform distribution on individual order prefer-
ences, for every asymmetric relation R, the probability, for a random voter
proﬁle, that the social preferences are described by R tends to 1/8.
A result of Gulibaud (see Gehrlein (1997)) asserts that for the social
welfare functions on three alternatives based on simple majority, the proba-
bility for a cyclic order relation as the number of voters tends to inﬁnity is
1/4−(3/(2·π))·arcsin(1/3) ≈ .08744. In other words, if we assume that the
voter proﬁle is uniform and observe that the society prefers alternative a to
b and b to c, our a posteriori probability of the society preferring a to c tends
to 0.876. In contrast, in a similar scenario where the sequence Gk satisﬁes
relation (1.1) our a posteriori probability of the society preferring a to c will
tend to 0.5 (which is the a priori probability).4
4 (Kalai (2002) proved that for every monotone strong simple game this a posteriori
probability is always larger than 0.5.)
4We will now move from three alternatives to two and consider the eﬀect
of random noise. Suppose that there are two candidates and that the voters’
preferences are random and uniform or equivalently that xi = 1 with proba-
bility 1/2 independently for all voters. The noise sensitivity of f is deﬁned as
the eﬀect of random independent mistakes in counting the votes. Formally,
for a strong simple game G and t > 0, consider the following scenario: ﬁrst
choose the voter signals x1,x2,...,xn randomly such that xi = 1 with prob-
ability p = 1/2 independently for i = 1,2,...,n. Let S = v(x1,x2,...,xn).
Next let yi = xi with probability 1 − t and yi = 1 − xi with probability t,
independently for i = 1,2,...,n. Let T = v(y1,y2,...,yn). Deﬁne Nt(G) to
be the probability that S 6= R.
Deﬁnition 1.2. A sequence (Gk)k=1,2,... of strong simple games is asymptot-
ically noise-sensitive if, for every t > 0,
lim
k→∞
Nt(Gk) = 1/2. (1.2)
Our ﬁrst theorem shows a surprising relation between noise sensitivity
for two alternatives and the probability of Condorcet’s paradox for three
alternatives.
Theorem 1.3. A sequence (Gk) of monotone strong simple games leads to
social chaos if and only if it is noise-sensitive.
We will now deﬁne the complementary notion of noise (or stochastic)
stability.
Deﬁnition 1.4. A class G of strong simple games is uniformly noise-stable
if for every s > 0 there is u(s) > 0 such that Nu(s)(G) ≤ s.
Theorem 1.5. The family of simple majority functions Mn is uniformly
noise-stable. Moreover, Nu(s)(Mn) ≤ s for u(s) = K · s2 for some constant
K.
Our next theorems provide several additional equivalent properties of
social chaos which we believe justify this notion. We ﬁrst note that we
can consider slightly larger classes of games. A sequence Gk of monotone
5proper simple games has a strongly diminishing bias if for a random uniform
voter proﬁle, the probability of a “tie” tends to zero as n tends to inﬁnity.
An example is the class of simple majority games. All our results extend
from strong simple games to the case of monotone proper simple games with
strongly diminishing bias.
An asymmetric relation R on a ﬁnite set X is a binary relation such
that every pair of elements x,y ∈ X is ascribed one and only one of the
relations xRy or yRx. Clearly, there are 2(
m
2) asymmetric relations on a set
of m alternatives. For a monotone strong simple game G and an asymmetric
relation R on a set of m alternatives, let pR(G) be the probability under the
uniform distribution on voter proﬁles that the social welfare function based
on G will lead to R as the social preference relation.
Theorem 1.6. Let (Gk) be a sequence of proper strong simple games. The
following properties Pm are equivalent for m ≥ 3:
(Pm): For a social welfare function based on (Gk) on a set A of m alter-






Note that (P3) is simply our deﬁnition of social chaos. It is easy to see
that (Pm) implies (Pm0) when m0 < m. Surprisingly, the reverse implication
also holds when m0 ≥ 3.
Consider a neutral monotone social welfare function and a random voter
proﬁle U, and let R be the resulting preference relation for the society. Con-
sider the following scenario:
Suppose that every voter with a small probability t reconsiders and re-
verses the order of the two alternatives he ranked in the two last places. Let
R0 be the new social preference relation.
Theorem 1.7. Let m ≥ 2 be a ﬁxed integer and t, 0 < t < 1/2, be a ﬁxed
real number. A sequence Gk leads to social chaos if and only if any one of
the following equivalent properties is satisﬁed:
(Am) The correlation between R and R0 tends to zero with n.
(Bm) For every two asymmetric relations R1 and R2 on A, the probability
that R0 = R2, conditioned on R = R1, tends to 1/2(
m
2) as n tends to inﬁnity.
6(Properties A2 and B2 both coincide with the notion of noise sensitivity.)
In Section 2 we provide the mathematical tools and proofs for our results
concerning the equivalence between the diﬀerent properties of social chaos.
We also describe there relations with the Banzhaf power index and addi-
tional characterization in terms of the correlation with weighted majority
functions. Benjamini, Kalai and Schramm (1999) showed that the class of
weighted majority (strong) games is uniformly noise-stable. A stronger quan-
titative version was proved by Peres (2004). Benjamini, Kalai and Schramm
(1999) also proved that if (Gk) is sequence of strong simple games that is
asymptotically uncorrelated with weighted majority games, then it is noise-
sensitive.
In Section 3 we will analyze several examples. Consider the class of multi-
level majority-based voting rules described inductively as follows: (i) Simple
majority on an odd number of at least three voters has one layer. (ii) Suppose
that the players are divided into an odd number of three or more groups and
on each group we consider a game with r layers. If G is deﬁned by the simple
majority of the outcomes, then G is said to be a multi-layer majority-based
simple game with r + 1 layers.
Theorem 1.8. A sequence (Gk) of multi-layer voting rules based on simple
majority leads to social chaos if and only if the number of layers tends to
inﬁnity as k does.
The reason for the chaotic behavior is that any new level of majority
will amplify the probability of a cyclic outcome in three alternatives and
by a similar argument every new level will amplify the noise introduced by
mistakes in counting the votes.
When we base our rule on supermajority, social chaos may already ap-
pear for two layers. Consider a set of n individuals that is divided into
many committees of size k. The decision between two alternatives is based
on the majority of committees that prefer one of the alternatives by a 2/3-
supermajority. This rule deﬁnes a proper simple game and in order to have
a strongly diminishing bias we require that k = o(logn). We will show in
Section 3 that this example leads to complete social chaos when the size of
the committees tends to inﬁnity with n. The reason for the chaotic behavior
7in this case is that the outcomes of the elections are determined by a small
number of committees with “decisive views;” i. e., they are suﬃciently biased
towards one of the alternatives. Such a strong bias in favor of one of the alter-
natives is unlikely to survive following a small perturbation of the individual
preferences. We note that hierarchical or recursive aggregation of preferences
similar to those in the ﬁrst example, and cases where the social preferences
heavily depend on a small number of small communities with decisive views,
can both represent realistic situations of preference aggregation.
The assumption of uniform and independent voter behavior is a standard
one and is the basis of a large body of literature. Most of this literature deals
with the majority voting rule (see, e.g., Bell (1981) and Gehrlein (1997)). As-
suming uniform and independent voter behavior is unrealistic, though it can
be argued that for issues concerning noise sensitivity and Condorcet’s para-
dox this assumption represents a realistic way of comparing diﬀerent voting
methods. In Sections 4 and 5 we examine our probabilistic assumptions and
discuss the situation under more general probability distributions for voter
signals/behavior. Section 4 is devoted to the case that either the probability
distribution or the voting rule are a priori biased. In Section 5 we present
an example of chaotic behavior under the majority voting rule, when voter
behavior is not independent.
Perhaps the most important form of “noise” in real-life elections and other
forms of aggregated choice is abstention. In Section 6 we extend our model to
allow for individual indiﬀerence between alternatives. Analyzing this model,
we ﬁnd out that noise sensitivity implies that a small change in the fraction
of voters who decide to abstain has a dramatic eﬀect on the outcomes, similar
to the eﬀect of random mistakes in counting their votes. Section 7 is devoted
to a discussion of issues related to noise stability, information aggregation,
indeterminacy, the asymptotic nature of our results, and possible extensions
to other economic models. Section 8 concludes.
82 Proofs of the equivalence theorems
In this section we prove the various equivalent properties of sequences of
simple games that lead to social chaos. We also state additional equivalent
formulations. The proofs rely on two methods. A rather simple coupling ar-
gument allows us to move from noise sensitivity to the conclusions concerning
more than two alternatives given in Theorems 1.3, 1.6, and 1.7. The only
remaining step is to show that our deﬁnition of social chaos in terms of the
probability of Condorcet’s paradox for three alternatives implies noise sensi-
tivity. I am not aware of a direct probabilistic argument and the proof of this
implication relies on a rather elementary harmonic analysis of Boolean func-
tions. This part of the proof requires mathematical techniques and concepts
developed in Benjamini, Kalai and Schramm (1999) and in Kalai (2002).
Let (Gk) be a sequence of strong simple games. (All our arguments apply
unchanged to the case of proper simple games with strongly diminishing
bias.) We consider the following properties:
• (NS) Noise sensitivity
• (Pm) Asymptotically uniform distribution of social preference relations
when there are m alternatives, m ≥ 3
• Properties (Am),(Bm), m ≥ 2.
We wish to prove that all these properties are equivalent. The basic argu-
ments are presented in this section with some technical proofs presented in
the Appendix.
2.1 A coupling argument
Proof of the implication (NS)⇒ (Pk):
We rely here on a simple (coupling) idea which nonetheless requires careful
application. Consider a random voter proﬁle. For two alternatives a and b
consider the set V of voters for whom alternatives a and b are consecutive. We
will try to determine the eﬀect of reversing the order of the two alternatives
a and b with probability 1/2 for all voters in V .
9Let R and R0 be two asymmetric relations that diﬀer only for the two
alternatives a and b, namely, for a set {c,d} 6= {a,b} of two alternatives cRd
if and only if cR0d and for the two alternatives a and b, aRb and bRa. We






Consider the following process of determining two proﬁles P and P 0 of
individual preference relations:
Step (1): Determine the preference order relations between alternatives
a and b for every voter randomly and uniformly.
Step (2): Choose the order preference relations for all voters subject to
the voters’ preference between a and b that was determined in step (1).
Let P be the resulting proﬁle of voters’ order relations obtained by this
process. Of course, P is a uniformly distributed random proﬁle.
Let V be the set of voters for whom alternatives a and b are consecutive
in the preference relation. The set V is a random subset of the set of voters.
The probability that a voter i belongs to V is 1/(m−1) and these events are
independent. Moreover, the set V and the random voter preference relations
are independent.
Let P 0 be the voter proﬁle obtained from P by reversing the order relations
between alternatives a and b for every voter in V . Note that P 0 is also a
uniformly distributed random proﬁle.
Let R be the asymmetric relation obtained by applying the social welfare
function F to the proﬁle P and let R0 be the asymmetric relation obtained
by applying F to P 0. Note that the two relations R and R0 coincide for every
pair of alternatives except possibly a and b.
If we focus on these two variables we note that the distribution of voter
preference relations between a and b in P is random. We claim that the
correlation between the events aRb and aR0b tends to zero as n tends to
inﬁnity. Indeed, this follows from the fact that limn→∞Nt(fn) = 0 for t =
1/(m − 1). Q.E.D.
The proof of the implication (NS) ⇒ (Bm) is similar to the proof pre-
sented above and is presented in Section 9.1 in the Appendix.
10Proof of the implication (Pm) ⇒ (P 0
m) for m0 ≤ 3, m0 < m :
Let A be a set of m alternatives and let A0 be a subset of A containing m0
alternatives. A random uniform voter proﬁle on A induces a random uniform





2 ) asymmetric relations R on A. Given such an asymmetric
relation R, the probability that a social welfare function based on Gk will lead
to R tends to 1/2(
m
2). (By our assumption (Pm).) Therefore the probability
that the restriction on A0 will lead to R0 tends to 1/2(
m0
2 ) as required. Q.E.D.
The same argument shows the implications: (Am) ⇒ (Am0), for 2 ≤ m0 <
m.
2.2 An elementary harmonic analysis argument
Proof of Theorem 1.3:
As mentioned in the Introduction, a simple game can be described by a
Boolean function, namely, f(x1,x2,...,xn), where the variables xk take the
values 0 or 1 and the value of f itself is also either 0 or 1. Every 0-1 vector
x = (x1,x2,...,xn) corresponds to a subset of players S = {k : xk = 1} and
we let f(x1,x2,...,x2) = v(S).
Let Ωn denote the set of 0-1 vectors (x1,...,xn) of length n. Let L2(Ωn)




















(x1,...,xn)∈Ωn 2−nf2(x) is simply the probability that f = 1 (with re-
spect to the uniform probability distribution on Ωn). If the Boolean function
f represents a strong simple game then kfk2
2 = 1/2.




It is not diﬃcult to verify that the 2n functions uS for all subsets S form an
orthonormal basis for the space of real functions on Ωn.
For a function f ∈ L2(Ωn), let
b f(S) =< f,uS >
(b f(S) is called a Fourier-Walsh coeﬃcient of f ). Since the functions uS form













This last relation is called Parseval’s formula.
Remark: We will demonstrate now the notions introduced here with
a simple example. Let f3 denote the payoﬀ function of the simple major-
ity game with three players. Thus, f3(x1,x2,x3) = 1 if x1 + x2 + x3 ≥ 2
and f(x1,x2,x3) = 0, otherwise. The Fourier coeﬃcients of f3 are easy to
compute: b f3(∅) =
P
(1/8)f3(x) = 1/2. In general if f is a Boolean func-
tion then b f(∅) is the probability that f(x) = 1 and when f represents
the payoﬀ function of a strong simple game b f(∅) = 1/2. Next, b f3({1} =
1/8(f3(0,1,1) − f3(1,0,1) − f3(1,1,0) − f3(1,1,1)) = (1 − 3)/8 and thus
b f3({j}) = −1/4, for j = 1,2,3. Next, b f3(S) = 0 when |S| = 2 and ﬁnally
b f3({1,2,3}) = 1/8(f3(1,1,0) + f3(1,0,1) + f3(0,1,1) − f(1,1,1)) = 1/4.
We point out the following simple result:
Proposition 2.1. If f is a Boolean function representing a strong simple
game then b f(S) = 0 whenever |S| is an even positive integer.
12Proof: Let g = f − 1/2 (= f(x) − 1/2u∅). Since f represents a strong
simple game g(1 − x1,1 − x2,...,1 − xn) = −g(x1,x2,...,xn). When |S| is
even, consider the contributions of (x1,x2,...,xn) and (1−x1,1−x2,...,1−
xn) to the expression b g(S) =< g,uS >. Note that these two contributions
cancel out and therefore b g(S) = 0 for every set S of even size. It follows that
when S is a nonempty set of even size, b f(S) = b g(S) = 0.




2(S) : S ⊂ N,|S| = k}. (2.4)
Theorem 2.2. The probability Pcyc(f) of a cyclic outcome of a social welfare
function on three alternatives based on a strong simple game G with a payoﬀ
function f is





Theorem 2.2 is from Kalai (2002).
Theorem 2.3. Let G be a strong simple game and let f be its payoﬀ function.
The probability that an ￿-noise will change the outcome of an election is given
by the formula:





Theorem 2.3 is from Benjamini, Kalai and Schramm (1999). The proofs
of Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 are quite elementary and rely essentially on relations
(2.2) and (2.3). Note that we obtain a very simple relation between the prob-
ability for Condorcet’s paradox and noise sensitivity when the probability for
a noisy bit is 1/3.
2(Pcyc(G) + 1 = 3N1/3(G). (2.7)
¿From Theorem 2.3 we can easily derive (see Benjamini, Kalai and Schramm
(1999)):
13Corollary 2.4. A sequence (fn) of Boolean functions that represent strong





Wk(fn) = 0. (2.8)
As a matter of fact Corollary 2.4 holds as stated when the Boolean func-
tions (fn) do not necessarily represent strong simple games but rather satisfy
the probabilities that fn = 1 is bounded away from 0 and 1 as n tends to
inﬁnity.
Proof of Theorem 1.3: For this proof we need to compare the informa-
tion given by Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.4. Suppose that Pcyc(fn) → 1/4.
Recall that since fk represent a strong simple game b fk(S) = 0 if f is odd.
It follows from relation (2.5) that for every r > 0, limn→∞ Wr(fn) = 0,
which by Corollary 2.4 is equivalent to noise sensitivity. On the other
hand, if (fn) satisﬁes relation (2.8) then it follows from relation (2.5) that
limn→∞ pcyc(fn) = 1/4. (This implication was also proved earlier.) Q.E.D.
We now complete the proof of Theorems 1.6 and 1.7. We have already
proved the following implications: (P3) ⇒ (NS) ⇒ (Pm) ⇒ (P3) and (NS)
⇒ (Bm), for every m ≥ 3. Of course, if property (Pm) holds then property
(Am) is equivalent to property (Bm) and therefore (NS) ⇒ (Bm), m ≥ 3.
On the other hand, (Bm) ⇒ (B2) = (NS) and (Am) ⇒ (A2) = (NS).
Remark: We now continue to demonstrate the notions and results intro-
duced here with our simple example. As before, f3 denote the payoﬀ function
of the simple majority game with three players. As we saw, the Fourier co-
eﬃcients of f3 are described by b f3(∅) = 1/2, b f3({j}) = −1/4, for j = 1,2,3,
b f3(S) = 0 when |S| = 2 and b f3({1,2,3}) = 1/4. When there are three alter-
natives the probability for cyclic social preferences given by formula (2.5) is
1/4 − 3 · (1/4)2 − (1/9) · (1/4)2 = 8/(9 · 16) = 1/18. This value agrees with
the well-known outcome given by a direct computation. The value of Nt(f3)
is 1/2−2 ·(1 −2t)(3/16)−2 ·(1 −2t)3 · (1/16) = 3t/2−3/2t2 + t3. (Again,
this can be derived by a direct computation.)
142.3 Individual power
We conclude this section with a short discussion of the relation between noise
sensitivity and the Banzhaf power index. Let bj(G) denote the Banzhaf power
index of player j in a strong simple game G. Recall that bj(G) is deﬁned
as the probability that player j is pivotal, i.e., the probability that for a
random coalition S not containing i it is the case that S is a losing coalition
but S ∪{i} is a winning one. Let bmax(G) denote the maximum value of the
Banzhaf power indices and let I(G) denote the sum of the Banzhaf power
indices for all players in a simple game, known also as the total inﬂuence of
the game. It is known that in the case of n players, I(G) is maximized by
a simple majority game. (See, e.g., Friedgut and Kalai (1996).) For simple
majority games I(G) is proportional to
√
n.
Deﬁnition 2.5. The sequence (Gk) of monotone simple games has a dimin-




Proposition 2.6. If the sequence (Gk) of monotone simple games leads to
social chaos then it has a diminishing individual Banzhaf power.
The proof is immediate: when there is a player with a substantial Banzhaf
power the outcome of the game has a substantial correlation with this player
vote. A small noise in counting the votes will miss the vote of this player
with a substantial probability and therefore the correlation of the outcomes
before and after the noise will also be substantial. (Here “substantial” means
bounded away from zero.)
Deﬁnition 2.7. The sequence (Gk) of monotone simple games has a bounded
power ratio if the ratio bmax(Gk)/bmin(Gk) is uniformly bounded.
Given a monotone simple game G, let p(G) be the probability that a
random uniform subset of players is a winning coalition. If G is strong, then
p(G) = 1/2. Given two monotone simple games G and H on the same set N
of players let p(G,H) be the probability that a random uniform subset S of
15players is a winning coalition for both G and H. The correlation between G
and H, denoted by cor(G,H), is deﬁned by
cor(G,H) = p(G,H) − p(G)p(H).
The well-known FKG inequality asserts that for every two monotone simple
games cor(G,H) ≥ 0.
Deﬁnition 2.8. Two sequences (Gk) and (Hk) of monotone strong simple
games are asymptotically uncorrelated if
lim
n→∞cor(Gk,Hk) = 0.
Theorem 2.9. A sequence (Gk) of monotone strong simple games leads to
social chaos if and only if it is asymptotically uncorrelated with every sequence
of weighted majority games.
An important special case is:
Theorem 2.10. A sequence (Gk) with a bounded Banzhaf power ratio leads
to social chaos if and only if it is asymptotically uncorrelated with the se-
quence of simple majority games.
Theorem 2.10 together with our earlier results demonstrates the “robust-
ness of majority”:5 Voting methods (based on proper simple games where
the voters have comparable power and the probability of a tie tends to zero)
either have a substantial correlation with simple majority or else lead to
social chaos.
Theorem 2.11. Let (Gn) be a sequence of monotone strong simple games
with a bounded power ratio and suppose that Gn has n players. The sequence
Gn leads to social chaos if and only if limn→∞I(Gn)/
√
n = 0.
This result can be derived directly from the following result from Ben-
jamini, Kalai and Schramm (1999):
5 A term coined by Dasgupta and Maskin in another context.












Our principal examples of social welfare functions that exhibit social chaos
are based on multi-level majority. For their analysis we will have to start with
the case of simple majority. The outcomes of simple majority under random
individual voter proﬁles have been the subject of intense study. We will ﬁrst
require a few results concerning the behavior of simple majority. Given a
monotone strong simple game G recall that pcyc(G) denotes the probability
that for a social welfare function on three alternatives A, B and C and a
random uniform voter proﬁle the social preferences will be cyclic.
We start with a simple result concerning the majority voting rule with
an odd number of voters.
Lemma 3.1. Let Mn be a simple majority game on an odd number n of
players, n ≥ 3. Then,
(i) N￿(Mn) ≥ N￿(M3) = 3/2 · ￿ − 3/2￿2 + ￿3;
(ii) pcyc(Mn) ≥ pcyc(M3) = 1/18.
The proof is given in Section 9.2 in the Appendix. We point out that
Fishburn, Gehrlein and Maskin proved that pcyc(M2k+1) ≥ pcyc(M2k−1) for
every k ≥ 3. This implies, in particular, part (ii) of Lemma 3.1. The next
result describes the limiting behavior of majority when the number of voters
tends to inﬁnity.







17(2) Gulibaud (see Gehrlein (1997))
lim
n→∞
pcyc(Mn) = 1/4 − (3/(2 · π)) · arcsin(1/3) ≈ .08744.
It follows from relation (3.1) that as ￿ tends to zero limn→∞ N￿(Mn) =
(1+o(1))·
√
2￿/π. This is a more precise version of Theorem 1.5. We will not
reproduce here the proofs of Proposition 3.2 but rather will explain informally
why, for simple majority on a large number n of players and for a small
amount ￿ of noise, the function N￿(Mn) behaves like
√
￿. The median gap
between the number of votes of the winning candidate and the losing one in
a simple majority is close to
√
n. According to the central limit theorem the
probability that the gap is larger than t
√
n behaves like e−t2/4. It follows that
a large gap is extremely rare while below the median gap the distribution of
the gap is rather close to uniform. When we ﬂip ￿n random votes the median
gap between the number of votes for Alice that now go to Bob and votes for




n, and again it is rare that
this gap is much larger. In order for the noise to change the election’s results
we require (apart from an event with a small probability) that the original




n and this occurs
with probability of roughly
√
￿. On the other hand, if the gap between votes




n then the probability that the
noise will change the election’s outcome is bounded away from zero. This
argument indeed shows that N￿(Mn) behaves like
√
￿.
3.2 Multi-level games based on simple majority
The ﬁrst class of examples that exhibit social chaos are based on multi-level
majority where the number of levels increases. Recall the class of multi-
level majority-based voting rules described inductively in the Introduction:
(i) Simple majority on an odd number of at least three have one layer. (ii)
Suppose that the players are divided into an odd number of three or more
groups and on each group we consider a game with r layers. If G is deﬁned
by the simple majority of the outcomes then G is said to be a multi-layer
majority-based simple game with r + 1 layers.
18Deﬁne u(1)(￿) = u(￿) = 3/2 · ￿ − 2￿2 + 5/4￿3 and u(r)(￿) = u(u(r−1)(￿),
r = 2,3,4,....








Proof: The proof is by induction on r and the case r = 1 is given
by Lemma 3.1. Consider a random vector (x1,x2,...,xn) ∈ Ω(n). The
value of v(x1,x2,...,xn) is the simple majority of the (r −1) level outcomes
z1,z2,...,zm. Suppose that we ﬂip each variable xi with probability ￿. By the
induction hypothesis each zi is ﬂipped with probability of at least u(r−1)(￿)
and by Lemma 3.1 the probability that v is ﬂipped is at least u(u(r−1)(￿) =
u(r)(￿). When G = Tr is the recursive ternary majority game with r levels we
obtain that N￿(Tr) = u(r)(￿). To prove Theorem 3.3 we need to verify that
for every ￿ > 0, limr→∞u(r)(￿) = 1/2.
We will state separately the result for a bounded number of levels.
Theorem 3.4. Let φ(￿) = φ(1)(￿) =
arccos(1−￿)
π and let φ(i+1)(￿) = φ(φ(i)(￿),
i = 1,2,.... Let r be a ﬁxed positive integer. Consider a sequence (Gn)
of r-level majority strong simple games where each level is based on simple
majority of tn players. (Thus, n = tr






As ￿ tends to zero
N￿(r) ≥ (1 + o(1))(2/π)￿
1/2r
.
In our model, simple majority is considerably more stable in the presence
of noise than a two-layer election method like the U.S. electoral system. In
an electoral system with many states and many voters in each state, N￿(G)
is proportional, for small values of ￿, to ￿1/4. In a three-stage system of
this kind N￿(G) behaves like ￿1/8. Is the advantage of simple majority on
a two-level majority in terms of noise sensitivity relevant for evaluating the
19U.S. electoral method? Can we conclude that events like those in the 2000
U.S. presidential election are less likely to occur in a simple majority system?
While the probabilistic models are unrealistic, it appears that the advantage
of simple majority by a two-level electoral method is quite general.
Remark: The hierarchical voting methods considered here resemble the
multi-tier system of councils (“soviets” in Russian). Lenin (among others)
advocated this system during the 1917 Russian Revolution. Lenin’s concept
of centralized democracy is based on a hierarchical method of voting and
was implemented in the Soviet Union and its satellites for party institutions,
national bodies, and labor unions. (For national bodies, the method was
changed in 1936.) For party institutions (which were the most important)
there could be as many as seven levels. Party members in a local organi-
zation, for example, the Department of Mathematics in Budapest, elected
representatives to the Science Faculty party committee who in turn elected
representatives to the University council. The next levels were the council
of the 5th District of Budapest, the Budapest council, the Party Congress,
the Central Committee and ﬁnally the Politburo. Friedgut (1979) is a good
source on the early writings of Marx, Lenin, and others, and for an analysis
of the Soviet election systems that were prevalent in the 70’s.
3.3 Two-level games based on supermajority
The second class of examples of social welfare functions that exhibit social
chaos are based on a two-level method where the lower level is biased. Con-
sider a two-level proper game G = G[a,b,t], where t satisﬁes b/2 < t < b,
deﬁned as follows. There are a · b voters divided into a communities of b
voters each. Given a subset S of voters, we call a community C positive
if |S ∩ C| ≥ t and negative if |S ∩ C| ≤ b − t. The subset S is a winning
coalition if there are more positive communities than negative communities.
Let Gn = G[an,bn,tn] be a sequence of such games. In order for Gn to have
strongly diminishing bias it is necessary and suﬃcient that the expected
number of decisive coalitions tends to inﬁnity.




then the sequence Gn leads to social chaos.
The proof is given in Section 9.2 in the Appendix.
Remark: It can be shown by similar proofs to those we present that
social chaos occurs for more general hierarchical voting methods. This applies
both in the case where in each level the method is balanced and the number
of levels tends to inﬁnity and in the case where there are as little as two
levels and the method is biased in the lower level. (In the Appendix we will
formulate and prove a more general theorem that gives Theorem 3.5 as a
special case.) Social chaos may occur also for more complicated recursive
methods. For example the diﬀerent communities that we considered need
not be disjoint. But the analysis in such cases can be considerably harder.
4 Bias
The framework described in this paper extends to more general probabilis-
tic distributions of voter behavior (or individual signals). We expect that
the dichotomy described here between stochastically stable and chaotic be-
havior can also be extended, though such extensions are conceptually and
mathematically more diﬃcult. When we consider the eﬀect of stochastic
perturbations there are also various possible models for the “noise.” Does
it represent mistakes in counting the votes? or, perhaps, a small fraction of
voters reconsidering their positions or considering whether or not to vote?
We also expect that the stochastic stability of the majority rule extends to
various other probability distributions representing the voters’ behavior.
Our probabilistic model assumes three properties which we will discuss
separately:
(1) Independence: Voters’ probabilities (or signals) are independent.
(2) No bias: For two alternatives a and b the probability that the society
prefers alternative a to alternative b is 1/2.
21(3) Identical voters: Voters’ probabilities (or signals) are identical.
The assumption of identical voter preference distribution is unrealistic
but I expect that the basic results of this paper can be extended to cases
where the assumption of identical voter behavior is relaxed while the other
two assumptions are kept. We will concentrate on the other two assumptions
and discuss in this section bias and in the next section dependence between
voters.
The assumption of no bias is clearly an ideal assumption. A more realistic
assumption in many cases of aggregated choice is the assumption of “small
bias,” which is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.1. Consider a sequence (Gk,νk), where Gk is a proper simple
game with nk players and νk is a probability distribution on coalitions of Gk.
(Alternatively, νk can be regarded as a probability distribution on 0-1 vectors
of length nk.) The sequence (Gk,νk) has small bias if for some constant t > 0,
the probability pνk(Gk) that a random coalition according to νk is a winning
coalition satisﬁes
t ≤ pνk(Gk) ≤ 1 − t, for every k ≥ 1.
While it is hard to justify that a priori two candidates in an election have
the same probability of winning it is often quite realistic that the a priori
probability of winning is substantial for both. We will return to this issue
towards the end of this section.
We will describe in this section the extension of our results to cases with
bias. Bias occurs when the simple game is strong and thus neutral between
the candidates but the probability distribution of signals favors one of the
candidates, and also when the probability distribution is uniform but the
voting method itself is described by a simple game giving advantage to one
of the candidates. The results in these two types of extensions (and their
combination) are similar. The dichotomy between noise-stable and noise-
sensitive monotone simple games and many of the results presented in this
paper can be extended to the case of independent voter behavior with a small
bias.
22Recall that Ωn denote the set of 0 − 1 vectors (x1,x2,...,xn) of length
n. Given a real number p > 0, 0 < p < 1, Pp will denote that product




where k = x1 + x2 + ··· + xn. For a monotone simple game G with payoﬀ
function v = v(x1,x2,...,xn), deﬁne
Pp(G) =
X
{Pp(x)v(x) : x ∈ Ω(n)}.
Let t > 0 and consider the following scenario: ﬁrst choose the voters’
signals x1,x2,...,xn at random such that xi = 1 with probability p indepen-
dently for i = 1,2,...,n. Consider S = v(x1,x2,...,xn). Next let yi = xi
with probability 1 − t and yi = 1 − xi with probability t, independently
for i = 1,2,...,n. Let T = v(y1,y2,...,yn). Let C
p
t (G) be the correlation
between S and R.
Deﬁnition 4.2. Consider a sequence (Gk,pk)k=1,2,... where Gk is a monotone
simple game and 0 < pk < 1. The sequence (Gk,pk) is asymptotically noise-





t (Gk) = 0.
In the case of small bias, namely, when Ppk(Gk) is bounded away from
0 and 1, Theorem 1.6, which asserts that simple majority is noise-stable,
extends and so do Theorems 2.9 and 2.12.
If limk→∞ Ppk(Gk) = 1 (or 0) the sequence is always noise-sensitive.
Theorem 4.3. Every sequence (Gk,pk) of monotone simple games where
limn→∞ Ppk(Gn) = 1 (or 0) is noise-sensitive.
Theorem 4.3 follows from a Fourier-theoretic interpretation of noise sen-
sitivity, which extends the formula for the uniform distribution and a certain
inequality of Bonamie and Beckner.
Perhaps some explanation of the meaning of noise sensitivity in the pres-
ence of bias is in order. When there are two alternatives noise sensitivity can
be described in two ways:
23• (i) The result following a small perturbation is asymptotically uncor-
related with the original result.
• (ii) The probability that a small perturbation will change the collective
choice tends to 1/2.
The reason that when there is no bias (i) implies (ii) is that the model
assigns equal probabilities to the two outcomes. Property (i) may extend to
rather general probability distributions but the dramatic conclusion in (ii)
requires that there be no bias.
Assuming small bias, condition (i) implies the following:
• (iii) With a probability uniformly bounded away from zero, a small
amount of noise will change the outcome of the election.
Note that for a sequence of games (Gk) with small bias in order to con-
clude property (iii) it is enough to assume a weaker property than noise
sensitivity. Property (iii) follows if the sequence (Gk), in addition to having
small bias, is uniformly chaotic, which is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.4. Consider a sequence (Gk,pk)k=1,2,... where Gk is a monotone
proper simple game and 0 < pk < 1. The sequence (Gk,pk) is uniformly





t (Gk) < 1 − α.
It is interesting to compare what happens to conditions (i) and (iii) when
the bias get larger (maintaining the assumption of independent and identical
voter preferences). In an election between Alice and Bob, when the prob-
ability of Alice winning tends to zero then so does the probability that a
small random perturbation in voter behavior will change the outcome of the
election. On the other hand, Theorem 4.3 asserts that in this case it is al-
ways true, even for the majority rule, that the correlation between outcomes
before and after the noise also tends to zero. Roughly speaking, Theorem 4.3
asserts that when your probability of winning the election is small and you
have the option of forcing a recount of a random ﬁxed fraction of votes, this
24option almost doubles your chances of winning (for the majority rule and for
any other voting rule).
Our next proposition, whose proof follows directly from the deﬁnition of
uniform noise stability, asserts that the property of noise stability is itself
stable under small changes in the probability distribution.
Let n(k) be a monotone sequence of positive numbers. Consider two
sequences (νk) and (ν0
k) where νk and ν0
k are probability distributions on
Ωk(n). We say that ν and ν0 are asymptotically non-singular if for every
sequence of events Sk ∈ Ωk(n), limν(Sk) = 0 if and only if limν0(Sk) = 0.
Proposition 4.5. Consider a family G of strong simple games which is uni-
formly noise-stable. Suppose that pn is a sequence of probabilities such that
the distributions Ppn on Ωn are asymptotically non-singular to the uniform
distribution. Then G is uniformly noise-stable w.r.t. the distributions Ppn.
The stability of uniform noise stability extends to small perturbations of
the voters’ proﬁle distribution, and the distribution describing the noise does
not require the assumption of independent voters.
We will now brieﬂy deal with three or more alternatives. Let η be a
probability distribution on order relations on a set A of alternatives. Given a
set of n voters we will denote by Pη the probability distribution on the voters’
proﬁle where the voters’ preferences are independent and are described by η.
We will assume that for every two alternatives a and b the probability that
aRb when R is chosen at random according to η is strictly between 0 and 1.
We will study the distribution of social preferences when the voters’ proﬁles
are distributed according to Pη. Consider the probability distribution pη










This distribution pη(R) represents the following scenario. For every indi-
vidual the order relations among the m alternatives are distributed according
to η and are independent. The distribution on the social preference is based
on the following procedure. For every two alternatives a and b choose an in-
dividual va,b and let the the social preference between a and b agree with the
25preference of this individual. Assume that all these individuals are diﬀerent.
The resulting distribution on the social preferences is pη.
We will now extend the deﬁnition of social chaos to strong monotone
simple games and arbitrary distributions η on the individual order relations.
Deﬁnition 4.6. A sequence (Gk)k=1,2,... of strong simple games leads to
social chaos w.r.t. the probability distribution η on voters’ order preferences
if for every three alternatives a, b, and c the probability that the society
prefers alternative a to alternative c given that it prefers a to b and b to c is
asymptotically the same as the a priori probability that the society prefers a
to c.
Given these deﬁnitions, Theorems 1.3 and 1.7, part (A)k (and their
proofs) extend. In Theorems 1.6 and Theorem 1.7, part (B)k, one has to
replace the uniform distribution on all asymmetric relations by the distribu-
tion pηk.
We conclude this section by a brief discussion of the assumption of small
bias. The assumption of small bias is realistic and this by itself can be
regarded as a surprising phenomenon. Why is it the case that so often
shortly before an election we can give substantial probability for each one of
two candidates to be elected? How come the probabilities that we can assign
to the choices of each voter do not “sum up” to a decisive collective outcome?
This seems especially surprising in view of the property of aggregation of
information. It is worth noting that there are several factors that can push
the situation of collective choice towards small bias:
(i) Abstention and other strategic considerations of voters: If a voter’s in-
centive to vote is based (as is often assumed) on his chances of being pivotal,
then for voters acting strategically, abstention or applying mixed strategies
and not acting just based on the signals may drive the situation towards
criticality. See, e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1998) where super-
majority is studied, and Samet (2004) for general simple games.6
6 In these cases strategic behavior leads to asymptotic complete aggregation of infor-
mation in the sense that if there are independent individual signals weakly biased toward
the superior alternative then with probability tending to one the superior alternative will
be chosen.
26If there are two main candidates and a few additional candidates who are
each ideologically close to one of these two, a voter may choose to vote for
a minor candidate if he knows that his vote is not needed to decide between
the main candidates. Again, this can push the situation between the two
main candidates towards criticality.
(ii) Strategic considerations of candidates: In elections, such as those in
the U.S., the candidates concentrate their eﬀorts on swing states. This may
lead to critical behavior in some of these states.
(iii) Choice out of equilibrium: Consider the diﬀerence between the fol-
lowing two scenarios: a) choosing between two types of products, b) choosing
between two types of products when the diﬀerence in quality is reﬂected in
their prices. In the second scenario it is more likely that we will observe
critical behavior and even more so when the decision-maker’s information
about the diﬀerence in quality is based primarily on the diﬀerence in price.
(iv) Dependence: A major reason why the assumption of small bias is
realistic is the lack of independence between voter preferences. Even a short
time before an election there is a nonnegligible probability that an event will
inﬂuence a large number of voters in the direction of one candidate.7
5 Dependence
Following is an example that demonstrates some of the issues that arise when
the voting rule is simple majority and voter behavior is not independent.
Suppose that the society is divided into a communities of b voters each. The
number of voters is thus n = ab, which we assume is an odd number. Each
voter i receives an independent signal si, where si = 1 with probability 1/2
and si = 0 with probability 1/2. The voters are aware of the signals of the
other voters in their community and are inﬂuenced by them. Let q > 0
be a small real number. A voter changes his mind if he observes a decisive
7 This type of dependence can imply failure of aggregation of information in the fol-
lowing sense: it is possible that every voter’s signal will favor a certain candidate with
probability (say) 0.6 and yet there is a substantial probability that the other candidate
will be elected regardless of the number of voters.
27advantage for the other candidate in his community, i.e., if he observes an
advantage where the probability of observing such an advantage or a larger
one, when voter behavior is independent and uniform, is at most q.
The election’s outcome as a function of the original signals s1,s2,...,sn
can be described by a strong simple game which we denote by G[a;b;q]. (The
example will also “work” if a fraction (1−α) of the voters vote according to
their signals and only some small fraction α > 0 of voters change their minds
as before.8
Let us examine the situation for a sequence (Gn) of such examples where
the parameters a and b both tend to inﬁnity, n = ab, q tends to zero, and p
1/q = o(
√
m). (For example, take a = b =
√
n, and q = n−1/4.) In
this case, Gn exhibit noise sensitivity for (independent) small amounts of
noise in the original signals. The outcomes of elections as a function of
the individual signals is thus completely chaotic. Indeed, the outcomes of
the elections are determined (with very high probability) by the number of
communities with decisive signals in favor of one of the candidates. The
expected number of decisive communities is qa. The diﬀerence between the
number of decisive communities favoring the two candidates behaves like
√
qa. Therefore, these communities contribute b
√
qa votes to one of the
candidates. Since the original gap in the number of favorable signals between
the two candidates behaves like
√





we conclude that the decisive communities determine the outcome of the
elections with very high probability. From this point on, the analysis is
similar to the proof of Theorem 3.5. 9
On the other hand, this same sequence is extremely noise-stable for inde-
pendent noise with respect to counting the votes! The gap between votes cast
for the two candidates behaves like b
√
qa so that even if a random subset of
40% of the votes are miscounted the probability that the election’s outcome
8 Another variant that will have similar properties is the case in which there are election
polls in each community that inﬂuence some small fraction of voters.
9 If q = t/
√
a, where t is small but bounded away from zero, then for every amount
￿ of noise in the signals, the correlation between the outcomes before and after the noise
will tend to a small constant; in this case the situation depends on the original signals in
a very, but not completely, chaotic manner.
28will be reversed is extremely small.
The two properties of our example: The ﬁrst property of chaotic behav-
ior for noise aﬀecting the original signal and the second property of strong
stochastic stability for noise aﬀecting individual votes seem characteristic to
situations in which voter behavior depends on independent signals in a way
that creates positive correlation between voters. This topic deserves further
study. Note that when we consider random independent noise in the origi-
nal signals, the distribution of the resulting votes is identical to the original
distribution without the noise. This is not the case for random independent
noise in counting the votes.
We now move from examples to more general models. A general model
for voter behavior will be of a pair < G,ν > where G is a strong simple
game representing a voting rule and ν is a probability distribution of voters’
preferences or signals. In this case we can consider random independent
noise that can represent mistakes in counting the votes. For such a form of
noise the distribution of the noisy signals will be diﬀerent than the original
distribution. Another form of noise can be described as follows. Given a
vector (x1,··· ,xn) of voters’ signals and another vector y = (y1,...,yn)
deﬁne
q(y) = (1 − t)
n−d(x,y)t
d(x,y) · ν(y),
and normalize q(y) to a probability distribution by setting
p(y) = q(y)/
X
{q(z) : z ∈ {0,1}
n}.
If the noise changes x to y with probability p(y) the distribution of the noisy
voters’ signals is the same as the original distribution. This type of noise can
be regarded as applying to the (unknown) mechanism leading to the voters’
preferences distribution ν.
A somewhat more restrictive but still quite general probabilistic set-
ting for aggregation is the following: there are some independent signals
s1,s2,...,st that may depend on the state of the world. At the stage where
individuals make up their mind they are exposed to some of these signals
directly and also to the emerging preferences of other individuals. The indi-
vidual’s ﬁnal preferences are then aggregated according to some voting rule.
29When we study the sensitivity to noise it can make a big diﬀerence if we
consider noise aﬀecting the original signals or noise aﬀecting the individual
choices (mistakes in counting the votes).
In such a general framework there are cases, such as the example presented
at the beginning of this section, when rather general simple games describe
the situation even for a standard voting rule. For simplicity we can restrict
ourselves to the case of simple majority rule. Suppose that the choice of the
i-th individual vi = vi(s1,...,st) is a function of the signals s1,...,st. If the
vi’s are monotone and satisfy vi(1−s1,1−s2,...,1−st) = 1−vi(1−s1,1−
s2,...,1 − st) then the outcome of the elections in terms of s1,s2,...,st is
expressed by a proper simple game G (see also Kalai (2004), Section 3). If
the signals are random and uniformly distributed on Ωt then the situation
can be considered within our frameworks. As we have shown, it is possible to
provide natural examples in which the elections outcome as a function of the
original signals will exhibit chaotic behavior. In addition to examples that
are hierarchical, like those we have considered, one can also consider cases
in which voters repeatedly update their positions based on the positions of
friends and neighbors.
6 Abstention
In real elections it is common for a large proportion of voters not to vote.
Abstention is thus the most common form of noise when it comes to real-life
elections and perhaps also other forms of aggregation. It is possible to ex-
tend our model and consider monotone and neutral social welfare functions
that allow individual indiﬀerence between alternatives. When there are two
alternatives a and b, a social welfare function can be described by a func-
tion v(x1,x2,...,xn) where each xi ∈ {−1,0,1} and also v(x1,x2,...,xn) ∈
{−1,0,1} . Here xi = 1,−1,0 according to whether the i-th individual prefers
a or b or is indiﬀerent between the two, or prefers b to a, respectively. For two
alternatives neutrality is equivalent to v(−x1,−x2,...,−xn) = −v(x1,x2,...,xn).
When we consider only ±1 variables, the function v describes a proper simple
30game G.10 We assume that v is monotone, namely, if xi ≥ yi,i = 1,2,...,n
then v(x1,x2,...,xn) ≥ v(y1,y2,...,yn). The function v determines a neu-
tral social welfare function on every set A of m alternatives.
We can study the stochastic behavior of social preferences as we did
before. Let (vn) be a sequence of functions of the types we considered above
and let (Gk) be the proper simple game associated to (vk). We need the
assumption that for every α > 0 if a random fraction of α among voters
are indiﬀerent between the two alternatives (in other words, if they abstain)
and the voters that do not abstain vote randomly and uniformly, then the
probability of social indiﬀerence tends to zero as n tends to inﬁnity. This
implies, in particular, that the sequence (Gk) has strongly diminishing bias.
Suppose that all voters vote; then we are back in the case we studied in
this paper (with the assumption of strongly diminishing bias) and the notion
of noise sensitivity and social chaos extend unchanged.
Our ﬁrst theorem asserts that if (Gk) is a noise-sensitive sequence of social
welfare functions then the eﬀect of abstention of even a small fraction of
voters is dramatic. (Note that the game Gk does not determine the function
vk but the result applies simultaneously for all neutral extensions of the games
Gk to cases of individual indiﬀerence.)
Consider the following scenario. Let R be the outcome of an election
between two candidates and random voter proﬁle (x1,x2,...,xn) without
abstention. Now consider another random voter proﬁle (y1,y2,...,yn) where
yi = xi with probability 1 − s and yi = 0 with probability s. Let R0 be the
outcome of the election for the voter proﬁle (y1,y2,...,yn).
Theorem 6.1. Consider a sequence (vk) of functions describing a voting rule
with individual indiﬀerence. Suppose that the social indiﬀerence is strongly
diminishing and that the sequence (Gk) of associated proper games is noise-
sensitive. Then the correlation between R and R0 tends to zero as k tends to
inﬁnity.
Our next result asserts that the property of noise sensitivity is preserved
with probability 1 under abstention.
10 Note that the payoﬀ function v uses the values −1,+1 instead of 0,1 to describe this
game.
31Theorem 6.2. Consider a sequence (vk) of functions describing a voting rule
with individual indiﬀerence. Suppose that the social indiﬀerence is strongly
diminishing and that the sequence (Gk) of associated proper games is noise-
sensitive. Let δ be a ﬁxed real number, 0 < δ < 1. Suppose that (G0
k)
is a strong simple game obtained from Gk when every voter abstains with
probability δ. Then with probability 1 the sequence G0
k is noise-sensitive.
We remark that a similar result applies when “noise-sensitive” is replaced
by “uniformly noise-stable.”
The next theorem, which is a simple corollary of the two theorems above,
asserts that if (Gk) is a noise-sensitive sequence of social welfare functions
then the eﬀect of abstention of even a small additional fraction of voters is
dramatic. (Again, the result applies simultaneously for all neutral extensions
of the games Gk to cases of individual indiﬀerence.)
Now, consider the following scenario. Let R be the outcome of an election
between two candidates and random voter proﬁle (x1,x2,...,xn) conditional
on the assumption that the probability of a voter abstaining is α ≥ 0. Let
(y1,y2,...,yn) be another random voter proﬁle where yi = xi with probability
1 − s and yi = 0 with probability s. Let R0 be the outcome of the election
for the voter proﬁle (y1,y2,...,yn).
Theorem 6.3. Consider a sequence (vk) of functions describing a voting rule
with individual indiﬀerence. Suppose that the social indiﬀerence is strongly
diminishing and that the sequence (Gk) of associated proper games is noise-
sensitive. Then the correlation between R and R0 tends to zero as k tends to
inﬁnity.
The proofs are described in the Appendix. Similar results apply to the
case of more than two alternatives.
7 Discussion
1. The superiority of majority. What are the simple games most sta-
ble under noise? It was conjectured by several authors that under several
conditions which exclude individual voters having a large power, majority
32is (asymptotically) most stable to noise. (See a discussion and a surprising
application to computer science in Khot, Kindler, Mossel and Ryan (2004)).
This conjecture was recently proved by Mossel, O’Donnell and Oleszkiewicz
(2005).
Deﬁnition 7.1. The sequence (Gk) of monotone simple games has dimin-
ishing Banzhaf individual power if
lim
n→∞bmax(Gk) = 0.
Theorem 7.2 (Mossel, O’Donnell and Oleszkiewicz (2005)). for a
sequence (Gn) of strong simple games with diminishing individual Banzhaf
power,




In other words, when the individual Banzhaf power indices diminish sim-
ple majority is asymptotically most stable to noise.11 A consequence of this
theorem based on theorem 2.2 is
Corollary 7.3. For every sequence (Gn) of strong simple games with dimin-
ishing individual Banzhaf power,
pcyc(Gn) ≤ 1/4 − (3/(2 · π)) · arcsin(1/3) − o(1).
In other words, for social welfare functions with diminishing Banzhaf
value, simple majority is asymptotically least likely to yield a cyclic social
preference relation on three alternatives.
2. Aggregation of information. Given a strong monotone simple
game G on a set V of players we denote by Pp(G) the probability that
a random set S is a winning coalition when for every player v ∈ V the
probability that v ∈ S is p, independently for all players. Condorcet’s Jury
theorem asserts that for the sequence Gn of majority games on n players
11 It is crucial to ﬁx s and let n tend to inﬁnity. If s tends to zero as n tends to inﬁnity
the situation can be very diﬀerent. For example, when s = 1/n the majority function is
most sensitive to noise.
33lim
n→∞
Pp(Gn) = 1, for every p > 1/2. (7.1)
This result, a direct consequence of the law of large numbers, is referred
to as asymptotically complete aggregation of information. In Kalai (2004)
it was proved that for a sequence of monotone simple games asymptotically
complete aggregation of information is equivalent to diminishing Shapley-
Shubik individual power.
The speed of aggregation of information for simple majority games is
described by the central limit theorem. For a monotone strong simple game
G, let T￿(G) = [p1,p2] and t￿(G) = p2 − p1, where Pp1(G) = ￿ and Pp2(G) =
1 − ￿. When Gn is simple majority on n players the central limit theorem
implies that t￿(Gn) = θ(
√
n). It is known that for n-player games (n being an
odd integer) and every ￿, t￿(G) is minimized by the simple majority game12.
The next theorem asserts that uniform noise stability (in a slightly stronger
sense than before) implies that up to a multiplicative constant the aggrega-
tion of information is optimal.
Theorem 7.4. Let (Gk) be a sequence of strong simple games such that Gk
has nk players and let ￿ > 0 be a ﬁxed real number. Suppose that the class
of games and distributions (Gk,Pp), p ∈ T￿(Gk) is uniformly noise-stable.
Then t￿(Gn) = θ(1/
√
nk).
3. Indeterminacy. Consider a sequence (Gn) of strong simple games.
Let m ≥ 3 be a ﬁxed integer, let A be a set of m alternatives, and denote by
Fn the neutral social welfare function based on Gn when the set of alternatives
is A. Let R be an arbitrary asymmetric relation on A. It was proved in Kalai
(2004) that if (Gn) has diminishing individual Shapley-Shubik power then,
for n suﬃciently large, R is in the range of Fn (in other words, pR(Gn) > 0)
and this property is referred to there as complete indeterminacy. Note that
social chaos (in view of Theorem 1.6) can be regarded as the ultimate form
of social indeterminacy as it implies that all the probabilities pR(Gn) are
asymptotically the same.
12 The fact that the derivative dPp(G)/dp is maximized for simple majority can be
found, e.g., in Friedgut and Kalai (1996).
34The main tool for showing that diminishing individual Shapley-Shubik
power implies social indeterminacy is the equivalence between diminishing
individual Shapley-Shubik power and asymptotically complete aggregation
of information. It also follows from the results of Kalai (2004) that diminish-
ing individual Shapley-Shubik power implies diminishing individual Banzhaf
power (but not vice versa). When we assume diminishing individual Banzhaf
power we can expect the following strong form of complete indeterminacy.
Deﬁnition 7.5. A sequence (Gn) of strong simple games leads to stochasti-
cally complete social indeterminacy if for every asymmetric relation R on a




Theorem 7.6. (1) A sequence (Gn) of strong simple games with diminishing
Banzhaf individual power leads to stochastically complete social indetermi-
nacy.
(2) A sequence (Gn) of strong simple games that is uniformly chaotic
leads to stochastically complete social indeterminacy.
The proof of Theorem 7.6 uses the argument used in proving Theorem 1.6
and for part (1) we require also a recent theorem of Mossel, O’Donnell and
Oleszkiewicz (2005), referred to as “it ain’t over until it’s over”. This theorem
roughly asserts that for any random voter proﬁle when a large random set
of votes is counted there is still (almost surely as n tends to inﬁnity) a
probability bounded away from zero (however tiny) that either candidate
will win. We defer further details to the Appendix.
4. Noise stability. This paper is mainly devoted to the chaotic behavior
of noise-sensitive classes of simple games. There are interesting issues con-
cerning the behavior of social preferences for social welfare functions based
on uniformly noise-stable classes of simple games, and random uniform voter
proﬁles. I will mention one topic worth further study: suppose that we are
interested in the social preference relation between two alternatives A and
B but we can cannot compare these two alternatives directly. Rather, we
can compare both A and B with other alternatives C1,C2,...Cr. Suppose
35that for all those alternatives we discover that the society prefers A to Ci
and Ci to B. It seems true that as r grows we can conclude that the society
prefers A to B with higher and higher probability that tends to 1 as r tends
to inﬁnity. This is unknown even for simple majority. (In contrast, it follows
from Theorem 1.6 that for every ﬁxed r and a noise-sensitive sequence (Gn)
of strong simple games, the a posteriori probability that the society prefers
A to B tends to 1/2.)
5. Other economic models. We study noise sensitivity and its chaotic
consequences for social welfare functions. It would be interesting to study
similar questions for other economic models and, in particular, for exchange
economies and more general forms of economies. Related notions of inde-
terminacy, aggregation of information, pivotal agents, and power were con-
sidered for various models of economies and some analogies with results in
social choice theory can be drawn. The well-known Sonnenschein-Debreu-
Mantel theorem concerning demand functions for exchange economies is an
indeterminacy result that implies that various dynamics for reaching equilib-
rium points can be chaotic. Yet, it appears that exchange economies behave
in a similar way to weighted majority functions and are thus quite stable
to noise in terms of initial endowments and individual demand functions.
More complicated models of economies (or simple models under a compli-
cated probabilistic environment) appear to exhibit a more chaotic behavior
in the sense of this paper.
6. The asymptotic nature of our results. We would like to stress
that our approach and results are asymptotic: we consider the situation when
the number of individuals tends to inﬁnity. The number of alternatives m
and the noise ￿ are supposed to be ﬁxed as n tends to inﬁnity, so one has
to be careful in drawing conclusions for numerical values of n, ￿, and m.
Moreover, the dichotomy between stochastic stability and complete chaos is
based on ﬁrst ﬁxing ￿ and letting n tend to inﬁnity and then letting ￿ tend
to zero. Studying the dependence on ￿ even for multi-level majority-based
rules gives a more involved picture than that discussed in Section 7.
368 Conclusion
Social welfare functions form a simple and basic model in economic theory
and political science. We have considered their probabilistic behavior under
uniformly distributed voter proﬁles. In contrast to social welfare functions
based on simple majority (or weighted majority) which demonstrate stable
behavior to small stochastic perturbations, in this paper we studied a class
of social welfare functions that demonstrate completely chaotic behavior and
showed that this class can be characterized in surprisingly diﬀerent ways.
This class contains some rather natural examples. Chaotic behavior occurs
in our model for hierarchical or recursive aggregation of preferences and in
cases where the social preferences heavily depend on a small number of small
communities with decisive views.
One interpretation of our results relates to the primary role of the ma-
jority rule. There have been many eﬀorts to demonstrate the dominance of
majority among voting rules. Analysis of sensitivity to noise gives a clear
advantage to the majority rule. Our results on the stochastic robustness of
majority and the chaotic nature of methods that are asymptotically orthogo-
nal to majority point in this direction. So is the result by Mossel, O’Donnell
and Oleszkiewicz (2005) on the asymptotic optimality of the majority rule
in terms of sensitivity to noise. The majority rule is a very simple and very
basic economic/political mechanism and an analysis of sensitivity to noise
in a similar manner to ours may be an important aspect in evaluating other
economic mechanisms.
Do we witness chaotic behavior in realistic economic situations of pref-
erence aggregation? A complete social chaos of the kind considered in this
paper is an ideal rather than a realistic economic phenomenon. However, I
would expect to ﬁnd chaotic components in real-life examples of preference
aggregation and in my opinion complete (stochastic) stability of the kind we
observe for weighted majority is often unrealistic. Understanding the chaotic
components (in the sense of this paper) in other stochastic economic models
is worthy of further study.
379 Appendix
9.1 Proof of the implication (NS) ⇒ (Bm)
Consider a sequence (Gk) of strong simple games that is noise-sensitive. We






Therefore, assuming noise sensitivity, property (Am) implies property (Bm).
We will now prove that noise sensitivity implies property (Am).
Consider a random proﬁle P and let R = F(P). We need the following
lemma:
Lemma 9.1. Let (Gk) be a noise-sensitive sequence of strong simple games.
Let x be a random vector in Ωn and let (V 1,V 2,...,V r) be random par-
titions of the players of Gk into r disjoint parts. For j = 1,2,...,r let
y
j
i = xi if i / ∈ Vj and if xi ∈ Vj let y
j
i = xi with probability 1 − t and
y
j
i = 1−xi with probability t. (Independently for i ∈ Vj. Let (z0,z1,...,zk) =
(Gk(x),Gk(y1),...Gk(yr)). Then, as k tends to inﬁnity, the distribution of
(z0,z1,...,zr) tends to the uniform distribution on Ωr+1.
Proof: Note that for r = 1 this is just the deﬁnition of noise sensitivity.
Consider the following process:
(1) Choose a random set of players Vj such that each player belongs to
Vj with probability 1/r.
(2) Choose a random assignment xi : i / ∈ Vj of 0-1 values for the players
not in Vj, and let yi = xi for these players.
(3) Choose at random an assignment xi : i ∈ Vj.
(4) Choose at random another assignment vi : i ∈ V such that yi = xi if
i / ∈ Vj and for i ∈ Vj, yi = xi with probability 1 − t and yi = xi, otherwise
(independently for diﬀerent players).
Now consider the probability z over choices (1) and (2) that the four
probabilities over choices (3) and (4) that f(x) = σ1 and f(y) = σ2, for
σi = 0,1,i = 1,2, all belong to the interval 1/4 − ￿0,1/4 + ￿0.
38Noise sensitivity implies that for every ￿0 > 0, z approaches 1 as k tends to
inﬁnity. In fact, this is a complicated form of the deﬁnition of noise sensitivity
where the noisy bits are chosen in two stages: in the ﬁrst stage a random
subset of players is chosen and in the second stage a random subset of these
players are chosen.
Let ￿0 = ￿/r and choose k large enough so that z ≥ 1−￿/2r. The assertion
of the lemma will now follow.
Q.E.D.
We return now to the proof of the implication (NS) ⇒ (Bm). Let P be a
random proﬁle of voter preferences. Let R be the social preference relation
for some random voter’s proﬁle P. The relation R is a random variable.
Suppose now that a fraction 2t of voters, chosen at random, switch, with
probability 1/2, the last two alternatives in their order preference relation.
Let P 0 be the new proﬁle. Let Va,b be the set of voters such that their two





. Therefore the sets V (a,b) form a random partition and










pairs {a,b} tends to 1/2(
m
2), which is the desired result.
9.2 Proofs of properties of simple majority and multi-
level majority
Proof of Theorem 1.5: Let f2k+1 be the majority function on the set
V = {1,2,...,2k+1}. In order to prove Lemma 3.1 we will study the Fourier-
Walsh coeﬃcients of f2k+1. For a Boolean function f the coeﬃcient b f({j})
by deﬁnition equals
P
S⊂V,j/ ∈S 2−nf(S) −
P
S⊂V,j∈S 2−nf(S). Therefore, if f
is monotone we obtain that
b f({j}) = −bj(f)/2,
where bj(f) is the Banzhaf value of j in f.




/22k+1. Recall that for a Boolean




2(S) : S ⊂ N,|S| = k}.
39For every Boolean function that represents a strong simple game:





2 = 1/2, and
(3) Wk(f) = 0 for an even integer k > 0 (Proposition 2.1).












It is easy to verify that this expression is monotone decreasing with k. There-
fore, if k ≥ 1 the value of W1(f2k+1) is minimized for k = 1, namely, for
simple majority on three voters. For k = 1 we get W1(f3) = 3/16. Of course,
b f3(S) = 0 for |S| > 3 and therefore Wk(f3) = 0 for every k ≥ 3 . It follows
that for every k ≥ 1, W1(f2k+1) ≤ W1(f3) and Wr(f2k+1) ≥ Wr(f3).
These relations with Theorems 2.3 and t:arrow imply our result. Indeed,
Theorem 2.3 asserts that the probability N￿(f) that an ￿-noise will change
the outcome of an election is given by the formula:





When we compare this expression for f3 and f2k+1 the result follows from
the fact that when we pass from f3 to f2k+1 the weights Wi’s (whose sum is
constant) are shifted from the lower values of i to the larger ones. Formally,
the proof is completed by the following standard lemma:
Lemma 9.2. Let a1 > a2 > ...,an > 0 be a sequence of real numbers.
Let b = (b1,b2,...,bn) and b0 = (b0
1,b0
2,...,b0

















The same argument or just applying Relation 2.7 implies part (i).
Proof of Theorem 3.5:
Consider the following class of two-level games G(r,m,H). We have r
committees of m players in each committee. In each committee the win-
ner is determined (with a possibility of indiﬀerence) according to a proper
40monotone simple game H on m players. The society’s decision is based on
majority. Given a sequence Gk = G(rk,mk,Hk) of such games we make the
following assumption:
The probability pk = p(Hk) that a random coalition is winning in the
game Hk satisﬁes:
(1) limk→∞pk = 0,
(2) limk→∞pk · rk = ∞.
Theorem 9.3. The sequence (Gk) is noise-sensitive.
Condition (2) implies that (Gk) has strongly diminishing bias, which is
a necessary condition for noise sensitivity: The expected number of decisive
communities for (Gk) is pk ·rk and therefore with probability tending to one
the election will be decided.
We will now describe the eﬀect of noise.
(1) Noise sensitivity given by Theorem 4.3 implies the following prop-
erties: the probability that a nondecisive community before the noise will
become decisive toward a speciﬁc candidate after the noise is pk(1 + o(1)).
(2) Theorem 4.3 implies that the probability that a decisive community
before the noise will remain decisive after the noise is at most pk(1+o(1)). Fi-
nally, the probability that a decisive community before the noise will become
decisive but in the opposite direction after the noise is at most pk. (This is
intuitively clear and can easily be veriﬁed from standard FKG inequalities.)
For the special case that Hk is supermajority game, (1) and (2) can easily
be derived by direct calculations.
The proportion of communities that are decisive before the noise is neg-
ligible and therefore by (2) the eﬀect of these communities is negligible after
the noise. The outcome of the elections is decided with a probability tending
to 1 by the communities that are undecided before the noise and, therefore,
the probability of each candidate winning after the noise tends to 1/2.
9.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Theorem 4.3 is the only result in this paper that requires a nonelementary tool
from harmonic analysis. We will give the proof for the case where pk = 1/2,
41namely, for the uniform probability distribution. In this case the bias comes
from the voting rule and not from the probability distribution. Corollary 2.4
(which is quite elementary) extends to the case of Boolean functions that
may have large bias, as follows:
Theorem 9.4. A sequence (fn) of Boolean functions is noise-sensitive if and








Wk(fn)) = 0. (9.1)
Note that by the Parseval formula
P
i≥1 Wk(fn) = qn(1 − qn), where
qn = kfnk2
2 is simply the probability that fn equals 1. (In the case that
(fn) represent a strong simple game or represent games with small bias the
denominator on the right-hand side of relation (9.1) is bounded from zero
and can be deleted.) In view of formula (9.1) relating the noise sensitivity
to the Fourier coeﬃcients, in order to demonstrate noise sensitivity we have
to show that most of the Fourier coeﬃcients of fn (in terms of the 2-norm of
fn) are concentrated on large “frequencies.”
For a real function f : Ωn → R, f =





The Bonamie-Beckner inequality (see, e.g., Benjamini, Kalai and Schramm
(1999)) asserts that for every real function f on Ω(n),
kT￿(f)k2 ≤ kfk1+￿2.
For a Boolean function f, note that for every t, kfkt
t = P(f). It fol-







This is suﬃcient to show that relation 9.1 holds even when k depends on n
and is set to be [log(1/(qn · (1 − qn))/4].
429.4 The results about abstention
Proof of Theorem 6.1: Consider the following process. We choose a
sequence u of random signals for all voters and let S1 be the outcome of the
election had everybody voted. Next we choose a random set T of tn voters
who abstain. Let S2 be the outcome then. Let S3 be the outcome if the
votes of these tn players are determined by coin-ﬂips independently of their
original signals. Noise sensitivity for a sequence Gk of strong simple games
asserts that with a large probability (namely, for a probability tending to
1 as k tends to inﬁnity) over the choices of u and T the probability that
S1 = S2 is close to 1/2. Divide the set of 2n signals into 2n−1 pairs of the
form (u1,...,un) and (1 − u1,...,1 − un). Consider now a random uniform
and independent choice of
(a) the set T,
(b) a pair of signals {u,1 − u}.
Based on the choices of (a) and (b), deﬁne random variables S1, S2, and
S3 as follows. Choose either u or 1 − u with probability 1/2 and deﬁne S1,
S2 and S3 as above. Since our game is strong, for every choice of (a) and (b)
both S1 and S2 have the value 1 with probability 1/2 and 0 with probability
1/2. Noise sensitivity implies that with a large probability over the choices
(a) and (b) the probability that S1 = S3 is close to 1/2. Therefore, with a
large probability the probability that S2 = S3 is close to 1. This means that
for every t > 0 with a large probability if we choose u uniformly at random
the correlation between the outcome of the elections and the outcome when
a random set of tn voters abstain tends to 0.
Proof of Theorem 6.2 (sketch): We want to show that if (Gk) is
a sequence of noise-sensitive strong games with indiﬀerence, t > 0 a real
number, and if (G0
k) is obtained from (Gk) by letting a fraction of t of the
players chosen at random abstain, then with probability 1 the sequence (G0
k)
is noise-sensitive. We can repeat the argument of the previous theorem based
on the observation that the eﬀect of a fraction of t players abstaining is similar
to the eﬀect of a fraction of t players reconsidering their position and voting
with the same probability for each candidate independently of the original
signals.
439.5 It ain’t over until it’s over
Sketch of the proof of Theorem 7.6: In the proof of Theorem 1.6 we
considered two asymmetric relations R and R0 on m alternatives that diﬀer
only in the ranking of the two last alternatives and used noise sensitivity to
show that the ratio pR(Gn)/pR0(Gn) tends to one as n tends to inﬁnity. If
we want to show only that the ratio pR(Gn)/pR0(Gn) is bounded away from
0 we need a weaker property for the sequence (Gn), referred to as [IAOUIO],
which is deﬁned as follows:
Let G be a monotone simple strong game considered as a voting rule
between Alice and Bob with n voters. Let ￿ > 0 and δ > 0 be small real
numbers. Given a set S of voters and the way these voters vote, let Q denote
the probability when the remaining voters vote uniformly at random that
Alice will win the elections. Let q(G;￿,δ) be the probability that a random
choice of a set S of (1 − ￿)n of the voters and a random choice of the way
voters in S voted the value of Q is at least δ.
Consider a sequence (Gn) of strong simple games regarded as voting rules.
The sequence (Gn) has property [IAOUIO] if




It can be shown using the central limit theorem that the sequence of
simple majority games on n players has the property [IAOUIO]. In this case
δ can be taken to be e−￿−2
. As indicated above the proof of Theorem 1.6
gives
Theorem 9.5. A sequence (Gn) of strong simple games with property [IAOUIO]
leads to stochastically complete social indeterminacy.
Showing property [IAOUIO] for a uniformly chaotic sequence of games
is immediate from the deﬁnition and therefore part (2) of Theorem 7.6 fol-
lows directly from the proof of Theorem 1.6. To prove the ﬁrst part we
need to show that diminishing Banzhaf individual power implies the property
[IAOUIO]. This is much more diﬃcult and was recently proved by Mossel,
O’Donnell and Oleszkiewicz (2005) in response to a conjecture by the author.
44Theorem 9.6 (It ain’t over until it’s over). [Mossel, O’Donnell and
Oleszkiewicz] A sequence of strong monotone simple games (Gn) with di-
minishing individual Banzhaf power has property [IAOUIO].
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